Caste and the conundrum of religion and development in India by Mosse, David
1 
 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/19861  
 
D. Mosse. 2014. ‘Caste and the conundrum of religion and development in India.’ In (ed) E. Tomalin.  The 
Routledge Handbook on Religions and Global Development. London & New York: Routledge. Pp. 200-214 
 
 
Chapter 14: Caste and the Conundrum of Religion and Development in India1 
 
David Mosse 
 
Introduction 
 
The emerging debate on ‘religion’ and ‘development’ has been challenged by some for 
unquestioningly deploying what are historically contingent, socially constructed and mutually 
constitutive categories. Arguably, separating out ‘religion’  renders development secular, as a 
value-free project of modernisation, or the expansion of consumer capitalism and liberal 
democracy; while the paired idea of ‘development’ strips the political economy out of 
religion, making it available for instrumental packaging as the ‘missing element’ (faith, trust, 
values, commitment) now supplied by self-defined Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) 
(Fountain 2013). Such an idea certainly lies behind the complaint that the ‘religion and 
development’ agenda is normative and instrumental in its approach; that it is agency-driven, 
and involves a narrow or overly institutional notion of religion, focused on ‘faith agencies’ 
(mostly Christian) as well as enclosing a Christian conception of religion as a matter of belief 
(Jones and  Petersen 2011).   
 
A counterpart to religion and development, is writing on religion in development, and of 
course religion as development or development as religion  (Salemink et al. 2004). Among 
other things, this throws light on projects of moral or ‘spiritual’ improvement contained 
within various development interventions, and the material transformations through which 
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religious reform movements are lived.  The idea that modernising development itself has 
gained a hold on the ‘discursive imaginary’, shaping expectations, dreams and aspirations, 
and in consequence imposing its goals and values so as to render people ‘under-developed,’  
to foster cultural self-denigration or cultural malaise,  is at the heart of the long-running 
postmodern critique of development (Escobar 2012: xii–xiii).  But, introducing an opposition 
between development and indigenous cultural life is itself rather unhelpful. After all, however 
understood, ‘development’ takes place through existing categories and meanings (see Peel 
1978, Robbins 2003); and articulating indigenous or local concerns in the language of 
development is also often a strategic means to engage with the state or other agencies in 
postcolonial societies (Gow 2008). 
 
These debates arise precisely because social life is not arranged according to binary divides 
such as ‘religion’ and ‘development'.  The purpose of this chapter is not further to argue this 
point, but rather to explore how the division between ‘religion’ and ‘development’ (or 
economy or politics) nonetheless acquires significance, how institutions of various kinds —  
missionary, colonial and postcolonial state, NGO, activist —  at different historical moments 
invest in these categorical distinctions in their approach to especially vulnerable people, and 
what the consequences are? 
 
I focus on the case of Dalits, that is members of inferiorised caste groups historically 
subordinated as 'untouchables', who comprise some 16-18% of the population in India and 
remain among the most impoverished and excluded groups. The condition of Dalits has been 
part of the social policy of the state, missionaries and churches, activists,  NGOs and other 
international organisations; and this social policy has produced and reproduced distinctions 
between religion and development (and analogously caste/class, ritual/economic, 
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status/power, church/state) in ways that have an enduring impact on the life chances of Dalits 
themselves.  
 
 
Dalit disadvantage and the categories of social policy  
 
Until the latter part of the twentieth century the social and economic condition of Dalits in 
south India was truly grim: they were mostly landless, tied into various types of agrestic 
servitude to ‘upper’-caste patrons and subject to a now well-known range of social-spatial-
ritual exclusions and segregations articulated in various idioms including impurity and 
pollution. Where Dalits are concerned, poverty and the denial of dignity (the refusal of 
resources and recognition) were both public code and social identity. There was no 
meaningful distinction between Dalits economically exploited as labourers (a class) and 
religiously inferiorised and ritually humiliated as a caste (Viswanath 2014a). And still today, 
control over labour and the distribution of rights to resources, access to public services 
(water, lighting, sanitation), educational opportunities and much more, arises from historical 
inequalities of caste. This is not, however, to suggest a situation of social stability or 
passivity. Changes brought by British rule in the 19th century may in fact have conspired to 
make matters worse for the Dalits (Washbrook 1993), but at the same time colonialism 
offered new opportunities, broader identities, and engendered various forms of resistance or 
challenge that acquired momentum in the century that followed, including those opened up 
through new religious affiliation.  
 
Since, as I will explain, significant numbers of Dalits are Christian converts, part of this 
discussion will concern Christianity and development. But my interest here is not in faith per 
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se, but the societal conditions under which interventions and responses to them come to be 
defined as ‘religious,’ or how religion and religious identities become part of the political 
system within which development policy is framed and resources allocated.   
Inevitably central to this discussion is the effect, first, of separating religious and political-
economic aspects of social life where this distinction has little prior meaning; and second, of 
abstracting the universal (identities and bases of claims) from the particularistic relations 
within which livelihoods are embedded.  The effect is thus not the ‘de-religionising’ of 
development (Fountain 2013) but rather the ‘spiritualising’ (or ‘culturalising’) of poverty,  
disembedded from the matrix of particular relations of power and economy.  I will suggest 
that the imposition of categorical distinctions (religion vs economy) and the disembedding of 
universal from particularistic relations that was born of 19th-century missionary engagement 
with caste and untouchability in south India, continues in other realms including both state-
led development and international human rights activism in ways that constrain attention to 
the specific structural disadvantage of Dalits and interrupt their claims (cf. Viswanath 2014b). 
 
Spiritualising poverty: Protestant and Catholic approaches to caste 
 
From the last quarter of the 19th century, for reasons still poorly understood, Christian 
missionaries of all denominations were astonished to find that the groups they called Pariahs, 
whom they had mostly overlooked in favour of sections of society thought to be more 
influential, began to convert en-mass.2 In consequence, the majority of Christians in India 
today are Dalit. We cannot be sure, but it is likely that conversion here was less a matter of 
signing up to a new belief, than of new allegiance and commitment that might make a 
difference to a situation of oppression. Certainly,  Protestant Missionaries intervened as allies 
of people they regarded as subject to 'slavery'  in ways that had economic effects — freedom 
5 
 
from debt bondage, the acquisition of titles to house-sites, or resettlement on agricultural 
wasteland (Viswanth 2010). However, to avoid the criticism that their converts were 
insincere materially-driven ‘rice Christians,’ missionaries were constrained to represent this 
political-economic change as spiritual transformation; and Dalits as oppressed by a Hindu 
religious system and in need of salvation from ‘spiritual slavery’ (Viswanath 2008, 2010). 
Precisely because for their Dalit converts the misery of the body and the misery of the spirit 
were not separate, for the missionaries this separation became crucial, and caste and 
untouchability entered policy debate and colonial policymaking as Hindu institution and 
practice (ibid). Understood as spiritual servitude, caste was to be challenged by altering 
mental attitudes. It could be said that missionaries did not seek fundamental change in the 
structure of an agrarian system, but ‘transformation [of] the attitudes and habits of Pariahs 
themselves’ (Viswanath 2014a: 4), stripping out the ‘Hindu excrescence’ of caste to leave 
unchanged a ‘rational core’ of class (Viswanath 2010: 145). 
 
Through missionary discourse on the ‘Pariah problem’ (Viswanath 2014b) Dalits gained 
access to the public realm (attention being drawn to the conditions of slavery from which 
India was thought exempt). However, this discourse also consolidated caste and 
untouchability as matters of religion separate from economic relations and exploitation 
(Viswanath 2008); and in these terms Hindu reform movements opposing missionaries 
shifted their perception of Christianity from being a threat to dominant caste interests 
(through the removal of biddable labour) to a threat to Hindu religion (ibid). 
 
Viswanath traces a parallel ‘conceptual apartheid’ (2014a:6) bifurcating the religious and the 
political-economic — caste and class— in the British colonial state’s Labour Department and 
labour policy, especially under the influence of (upper-caste) native politicians. This brought 
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about an artefactual distinction between policy on labour, on the one hand, and policy on the 
‘Depressed Classes’ (the Dalits), on the other; a separation that, Viswanath explains, led to 
diminishment of the colonial and postcolonial capacity to address the reality of Dalit poverty. 
Like those of the missionaries, measures of state welfare for Dalits, emphasised thrift, 
temperance and self-control, and involved a discourse of moral and economic change 
focussed on domestic transformation and the family as the source of mobility —  celebrating 
the thrift and self-sacrifice of Dalit women while making irresponsible alcoholic Dalit men 
the villains —  entirely ignoring caste subordination as a structure of antagonistic agrarian 
relations (2014a: 14).   
 
Of course the categories and abstractions of missionaries or the colonial state were not 
determinant of the meaning of new opportunities and provisions for Dalits themselves. An 
extensive literature shows how religious conversion and Christianity became part of on-going 
contests within agrarian society. In a pattern that finds itself repeated in different 
development eras, the various measures for betterment —  whether titles for house sites made 
available by the state, or chapels and Sunday services provided by the missions — were 
seized upon by Dalits as the means of struggle in an ‘agonistic and relational field’ 
(Viswanath 2014a: 20, original emphasis), against caste landlords and for greater autonomy, 
even where (as was often the case) this led to short-term material loss or vulnerability. While 
external agents imposed a conceptual distinction between the caste-religious and the 
economic-political3 that was irrelevant in practice, the local meaning of changes in wages, 
debt, access to land  and other material benefits always exceeded the ‘economic’, being part 
of the struggles in the relational field of caste; just as at the same time innovations in 
religious ritual — having a place of worship of one’s own and conversion itself —  were 
essential elements in reworking agrarian relationships and entitlements. 
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Catholic missions in south India (for reasons explained at length elsewhere, Mosse 2012) 
imposed a very different kind of distinction between the religious and the secular, but with 
similar effects. Much earlier (in the early 17th century), before the Dalit conversion movements 
through which Protestants ‘spiritualised’ caste, Jesuits had concluded that caste was a secular or 
civil order irrelevant to eternal salvation and compatible with Christian conversion. This 
allowed the retention of caste among converts, based on a clear separation of the ‘idolatrous’ (to 
be rejected) and the ‘civil’ (to be tolerated).4  Unlike the Protestants, they did not aim to bring 
spiritual release from the grip of caste, but rather build the Catholic Church as a religious 
domain beyond caste society. The practical effect was paradoxical: Catholic communities and 
their ceremonial life and festival practices became profoundly embedded in the relational 
world of caste, its hierarchy and exclusions; and yet the Church claimed a realm in which 
people of all castes worshipped as equals in the eyes of God. 
 
During the 20th century the always fraught boundary between secular caste honour (the  
distinctions of caste that Jesuits tolerated among converts as ‘civil’) and sacred worship (the 
religious realm in which caste claims were illegitimate)  shifted so as to bring more and more 
practices under ecclesiastical control. Until the late-19th century, the physical separation of 
castes within churches, and the separate administration of the Eucharist to Dalits at the back 
or outside the churches was compatible with the spiritual equality of all. But by the 1930s,  
these separations were regarded as infringement of Dalits’ religious rights as Christians, and a 
range of practices, including caste-organised Catholic saint festival systems, which ascribed 
ranked duties and honours (and associated entitlement to village resources) to a hierarchy of 
castes, which were earlier part of the domain of ‘secular’ village headmen, caste landlords 
and Hindu rulers were re-defined as Christian so as to annul claims to caste rights. Dalit 
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castes themselves found that Jesuit support for their struggles over entitlements to resources 
and caste honour depended upon the definition of the field of contest as religious rather than 
socio-political – that is, as a question of equal rights to worship as Christians.   
 
In different ways, Protestant and Catholic missions provided Dalits with fields of action in 
which their struggles against exploitation and subordination could be rendered spiritual (or 
Christianized) and thereby secure missionary backing. This was especially important because 
the British government in India had adopted a policy of non-interference in affairs of native 
custom and religion, which precluded legal action against  caste injustice, and meant that 
Dalits who were denied access to land or water, to temples or streets, or in other ways ill-
treated on the grounds of caste, had no recourse to colonial courts since (to Protestant-shaped 
policy) these deprivations arose from the practices of custom and religion.  
 
Religion and entitlement to state development  
 
Indian Independence changed things in  interesting but difficult ways for Christian Dalits.  
The space of equality marked by Christian religion was subsumed under a liberal paradigm of 
civil rights. Untouchability was secularized as a civic disability and socio-economic 
backwardness, and the Indian state introduced various protections, including laws which 
criminalized practices of caste discrimination, as well as reservations, welfare and 
development provision for the so-called Scheduled Castes. But although Dalits gained civic 
rights and development resources from the state, eligibility to these was defined in terms of 
religion. State provision was premised on the Protestant missionary idea of ‘untouchability’ 
as a debility arising from the practices of Hinduism. Thus, Dalits who were Christian or 
Muslim were (and are still) barred from legal protection as Scheduled Castes against the 
9 
 
‘atrocities’ (a legal category) of untouchability and from the development support of 
subsidized credit, scholarships,  housing  or a host of other schemes.  
 
Dalits who are Christian face a dilemma. On the one  hand, despite the importance of their 
Christian religious identity they  continue to be subordinated as ‘untouchables’, and are 
unable to ‘assert themselves as people other  than as described by their birth’ (Krishnan 
2011). The churches never had the power to make Christian identity determinate in social 
life, because this was something always blocked by non-Dalit castes in the village 
community. On the other hand, the state allows them to be nothing but Christian; their 
religion determining identity and blocking access to the means of development. The situation 
leads many thousands of Christian Dalits to convert officially to Hinduism in order to 
progress (get jobs, houses, credit etc): to convert for development. Eloquent autobiographical 
accounts capture the humiliation, guilt and betrayal that Christian Dalits experience when 
their faith is in question,  as well as the absurd interrogation and surveillance of individual 
religious practice that accompanies official verification of benefit entitlement (Gowthaman 
2002, Krishnan 2011). Fifty years of Church-backed protest against this as unconstitutional 
religious discrimination has produced no result. The reason for this has much to do with 
electoral logic (the extension of development privileges to a section of the Christian minority 
being a vote loser). But it also reveals a rigidity  of categories in the state system, equivalent 
in its impact to that of Christian missions. 
 
As Krishnan (2011) points out (following Chatterjee 1999), it is a necessity of the modern 
state and its politics that social boundaries are simplified and reified, and that community 
identities are contained and enumerated in ways that disregard social reality: ‘[S]ince caste 
was considered [by the Indian state] to be a creation of Hindu scriptures it was deemed not 
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possible for Christianity and Islam to have [their] followers identified by caste. If these 
religions admitted caste how [could] they be demarcated from Hinduism?’ And Christians 
and Muslims themselves needed these demarcations from the majority religion, Hinduism, if 
they were ‘to have their social life governed by personal laws other than Hindu personal law 
and were to be awarded privileges for running their institutions without the supervision of the 
state, which found it incumbent to administer the Hindu endowments and temples […] Hence 
no matter if people could see  as clearly as daylight that caste discrimination existed within 
Christianity in India, it could not be constitutionally recognised’ (Krishnan 2011). 
What is the effect of rigid categories on development? Any system of state provision that 
involves targeted categories constrains the articulation of demand and involves reflection by 
targeted groups on their own identity and entitlement — who they are and what they deserve 
(Still 2007: 280).  Dalits who have become Christian (in pursuit of selfhood) are denied 
identity as the state’s ‘injured subjects’ (Rao 2009: 177-78, Krishnan 2011: 14), or if they 
seek progress by means of state support by adopting the religious identity of the welfare 
category Scheduled Caste, they have to retreat to the very untouchable and Hindu identities 
they left behind. Either way, Krishnan points out, Dalits experience an unbridgeable split 
between the pursuit of recompense or development in the public domain of schemes, 
scholarships, or legal protection against violence, on the one hand, and the pursuit of 
transformation in the inner private domain which refuses the pre-assigned identity and asserts 
difference (through religious conversion); that is, their development through (Christian) 
religion.5  If missionaries disregarded the economic-political (‘development’) realities of 
Dalits by imposing on these the inner language of the spirit; the Indian state disregards the 
inner struggles for dignity, identity and spirit in the organisation of outer categories of 
‘development’ entitlement. 
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Christian Dalit development: Dalitising Christianity and the culturalising of caste 
 
We should not of course presume that because Dalit struggles against oppression were bound 
by the dichotomous categories of missionary or state agents that these provided the 
frameworks of meaning for Dalits themselves.  The field of Christian religious action was 
inseparably political and economic. Thus the ritual honours over which Dalits mobilised 
claims at Catholic saint festivals were signifiers of opportunity and chits for access to wider 
resources and recognition. In fact, post-Independence Dalit political mobilisation was born 
out of such contestation at saint festival  (Mosse 2012). The work on the self, enabled by 
Protestant  Christianity, for example in changed clothing, diet, the confident speech that some 
could acquire from Bible reading, or giving up drink (Krishnan 2010), was also a political 
challenge  to exclusion and stigma. As argued elsewhere (Mosse 2012: 181-6), Christianity 
has provided certain Dalits a way of  reflecting on difference and changeability,  separating a 
shameful past from a better future and is productive of a cultural capacity akin to what 
Appadurai (2004) calls the “capacity to aspire”.’ Locally, this enabled renegotiation within 
villages of relationships of labour and services that could not be abandoned, and might even 
be accompanied by an ‘upper’ caste Hindu perception of Christian Dalits as associated with 
tidiness/cleanliness, ‘closer to education’  and as ‘models of progress,’ as Krishnan’s (2010) 
informants told him.  
 
Those increasing numbers who join Pentecostal congregations also work to fashion lives 
anew in such ways, finding purpose and direction, in spite of persisting dangers and 
economic uncertainties. As Nathaniel Roberts notes of equally poor urban Dalit Pentecostals 
in Chennai, again Christianity is not a matter of faith apart from development (they are not 
fideists); it is not about change of culture. Christianity is about new knowledge and verifiable 
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truth;  about having reason to place trust in Jesus, and the confidence, transformation and 
displacement of fear that is said to follow. This new knowledge is not an accompaniment of 
modern development, it is development - a discovered universal, which makes the notion that 
Christianity is a cultural tradition, still less a western intrusion, absurd. As one Dalit  tells 
Roberts: “Do [people who reject Christianity as foreign] also reject tube lights because they 
are from the West?” “do they refuse to believe in airplanes?” (Roberts 2012: 278). 
 
Christianity may itself have had powerful effects on Dalit lives, or perhaps its practices 
provided a coordination point for pre-existing elements of Dalit identification now brought 
together and articulated in new ways. Either way, Christian identity and action embodied 
development and dignity independent of the particularism of caste. However, from the late-
1980s church leaders and activists influenced by a wider Dalit politics sought the recovery of 
socio-political caste —  of Dalitness— that was concealed in this ‘Christianisation’ of 
struggle.  
 
In the more caste-embedded Catholic Church, this Dalit turn arose distinctively as a protest 
movement (the Dalit Christian Liberation Movement) within and against the Church and its 
tolerance of caste discrimination in worship, education institutions, and the priesthood. This 
rebellious call to action by Dalit priests articulated the experience of Dalitness rather than 
Christianity.  Indeed, Dalit activist leaders across the churches increasingly defined Christian 
Dalit difference in terms of Dalitness (rather than Christianity).  As one prominent theologian 
wrote (Nirmal 1990, 129) ‘dalitness. . . is what is ‘Christian’ about Dalit theology, the broken 
Christ whom they [Dalits] can identify themselves with, follow behind and minister to, is for 
the most part non-Christian!’ (Pieris 1993, 38). Protestant churches especially provided 
centres for theological and cultural production, articulating an honourable ‘Christianised’ 
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Dalitness that fed into Dalit NGOs and movements connecting ideas of liberation and 
development to the assertion of cultural difference (a conversion discourse). Various types of 
symbolic reversal were drawn together to honour an “outcaste” culture, Dalit art and religion. 
Publicly staged celebrations of Dalit arts in theological seminaries involved re-imagining 
formerly inferiorized drumming and dance forms, setting them apart from the relational 
context of servitude, and rendering Dalit arts as ‘weapons for liberation.’6 
 
Articulating Dalitness (and the political claim to Dalit development) from within Christianity  
may have been a way of challenging the state’s categorical boundaries around caste and 
religion; forcing recognition of  Christians as Scheduled Castes while drawing Christianity 
into the politics of caste. But the cultural and theological work of Dalit activists also 
rearticulated Dalit struggle as a religio-cultural struggle against Brahmanic Hinduism in a 
manner that echoed 19th-century missionary models of caste. The central role of seminaries, 
churches and theologians in the Dalitisation of Christianity re-centralised religion in the 
matter of caste. These discourses of countercultural dissent were thus ironically aligned with 
the state interpretation of caste as based on a particular (Hindu, Brahmanic) religion.7   
 
The effect of disembedding caste into the language of religion and culture has also been to fix 
the meaning of caste and ignore evidence on how caste is perpetuated in many different ways, 
serving various purposes of exclusion and domination, labour control, surplus extraction and  
opportunity hoarding (Mosse 2010). When  caste is conceived as Brahmanical culture to be 
resisted  through ideological challenges (including religious conversion), it is abstracted from 
the broader reality of caste  as a system of graded economic rights, unequalised access to all 
sources of wealth (land, water, produce, education, employment etc.); from caste as a 
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structure of agrarian and urban class relations, and a form of political domination that is 
compatible with different religions.8 
 
Arguably the repeated process of ‘rendering religious’ for which caste provides a pretext has 
had a disabling influence on civil society actors working for Dalit development (see below); 
but it has also ensured the exclusion of the caste system from official (state and donor) 
frameworks for the analysis of poverty and the achievement the Millennium Development 
Goals in India and South Asia. This is again because the Indian government’s affirmative 
action is premised on the idea of compensation for historical disadvantage arising from the 
practices of Hinduism, rather than on caste discrimination as an on-going aspect of the 
economic system (Thorat & Newman 2010, Deshpande 2011). As a matter of religion (rather 
than socio-economics), caste falls outside the purview of mainstream economic planning and 
development policy of the secular state. As a matter which is ‘inner’ or cultural, it is one to 
which the Indian state works hard to block international engagement, whether by 
development agencies or the UN human rights system. And international agencies become 
themselves complicit in the way religion as a category is the pretext for a narrowed 
conception of caste and development.9  
 
The ‘Dalitisation’ of development and human rights 
 
There has been a two-decade long effort to break the structure of categories of religion and 
development and to bring caste into Indian development discourse. I want briefly to explain 
aspects of this development effort as well as how it inadvertently reintroduced  some of the 
categorical distinctions and distortions of Dalit experience which it sought to challenge. 
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I  begin in the late 1980s when I was first closely involved with south Indian NGOs (by then 
the most visible agents intervening in the lives of Dalit communities) as Oxfam’s Regional 
Representative (in Bangalore). The prevailing policy categories at that time involved a still 
unchallenged ‘economisation’ of poverty and a ‘culturalisation’ of caste. Officially, caste was 
peripheralized as a religio-cultural accretion obscuring the class relations that were the proper 
focus of change —  a view encouraged by the radical priests in Christian organisations whose 
Marxian and Liberation Theology training inspired the first generation of social action NGOs 
in the 1970s. Of course in the villages, NGO schemes of various kinds were in actuality 
folded into caste struggles that focussed simultaneously on fair wages and festival honours, 
land claims and teashop discrimination,  electricity and temple entry, street lights, access to 
water and the refusal of ritual subordination at funerals. But the obdurate separation in policy 
of material from ritual relations, class from caste, and the inadequate representation of Dalit 
experience, was especially apparent to NGO field coordinators who were themselves Dalit, 
working within familiar caste-structured village life, and who soon out of frustration with this 
formed their own NGOs. The rise of Dalit-led NGOs was one of several factors that moved 
caste and the fight against discrimination to the centre of NGO work in south India in the 
1990s (see Mosse 2011).  
 
The ‘Dalitization’ of NGO development policy was facilitated by the growing influence of  
Dalit activism and its multiplicity of movements, organisations and (later) political parties 
including the American Black-influenced Dalit Panther movement (Gorringe 2005), as well 
as by the allied turn to Dalits within Church social policy (noted above), which for example 
recast the Jesuit ‘preferential option for the poor’ as an ‘option for Dalits’ in 1987 (see Mosse 
2012: Ch 6). Such a reframing of development drew inspiration from the work of the 
preeminent Dalit leader Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar (d. 1956), whose birth centenary in 1991 
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brought national celebration and the availability of his writings newly in the vernacular. The 
centralisation of Dalits in development was promoted too by the opportunities opened up by 
the 73rd  Constitutional Amendment Act on local government, which reserved constituencies 
for Dalits and for women in elected bodies (Panchayats), and equally by the brutal denial to 
Dalits of these same constitutionally-guaranteed political rights, and by a broader swath of 
violence against Dalits across south India that manifested a reaction to Dalit acts of 
insubordination, self-respect and economic autonomy, targeting Dalit bodies (especially 
sexual attack on Dalit women) and property, and marking out for destruction signs of Dalit 
development —  radios, scooters, tiled houses —  by dominant castes for whom development 
was emphatically a relational matter. 
 
Thus, from within the NGO development field there appeared to come an approach that built 
on the everyday experience of the Dalit communities, and challenged the institutionalised 
separation of the religious-cultural and development. For the first time, caste was a 
development issue. The NGO capacity to articulate Dalit aspirations and to mobilise action in 
terms that were meaningful to the men and women with whom they worked was a hallmark 
of these initiatives.  This ‘Dalit development’ approach could be (and came to be) articulated 
and sustained as a coherent discourse, capable of enrolling a wide range of actors and 
agencies —  Dalit movements, state actors, lawyers, churches, donors and their European 
supporters, national campaigns and transnational advocacy groups. 
 
However, the manner in which caste was brought into development had inadvertent effects 
that paralleled the earlier disembedding of caste from the ‘totality of social relations’(Steur 
2012: 64) by missionary and state discourses. Three aspects of this can briefly be highlighted: 
first,  the relative autonomy of the framing of Dalit approaches to development from localised 
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relations of caste power; second, the selectivity and re-framing of Dalit experience involved; 
and third, a change in the articulation of demand by Dalits themselves that is brought about. 
 
On the first point, articulating a Dalit approach within the field of international development 
was  never going to be simply a matter of transmitting local caste struggles for wider and 
wider support; it was not  just a movement out from the local to ‘the global’ in order to solve 
village problems by linking them to ‘higher levels’ (Steur 2012). As in the earlier case of the 
missionaries, in order to build and sustain support, Dalit experience was abstracted and 
transformed as it came to be translated into other institutional agendas. Or, as Steur (2012) 
argues, ‘Dalit activism and the articulation of Dalitness is not constituted at any particular 
“local” level but emerged in a transnational social field’ (2012: 64). It was in the language 
human rights (HR) (especially after the 50th year celebration of the Universal Declaration in 
1998) that the Dalit turn in development policy was transnationally constituted, and through 
the set of pre-exiting activist and institutional links that the HR discourse afforded. Following 
the success (by 1994) of campaigns against apartheid, Steur points out, HR groups such as 
Human Rights Watch turned attention to India and to the continuing caste discrimination and 
spectacular atrocities against Dalits (see HRW 1999), as did international Church networks 
(in particular the World Council of Churches and the World Lutheran Federation), concerned 
for the large (Dalit) Christian population subject to violation of their human rights (ibid).10 
 
The tabling of the issue of caste discrimination at the 2001 World Conference Against 
Racism (WCAR) in Durban, and the large-scale presence of Dalit activists enabled by 
international support (ibid), were focal for regional and local NGO networking on ‘Dalit 
Human Rights’ within India. What occurred  in south India was a rapid  expansion of Dalit 
NGO networks, and ‘networks of networks’ such as the Human Rights Forum for Dalit 
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Liberation. Under the slogan ‘Dalit rights are human rights’ these networks  served to 
articulate and consolidate a discourse on development as a question of Dalit rights (and 
underdevelopment — inequality of opportunity, persistent poverty, unemployment, ill-health 
or low education levels  — as the effect of caste discrimination). International NGO donors 
(church and secular) found their own reasons to support a policy focus on Dalit rights and 
dignity, for example because this brought a desired holistic (material, social, spiritual) 
perspective to human development, or because as a target for funding, NGO networks could 
be imagined as social action that was locally initiated but regionally interconnected into a 
kind of self-organising social movement for ‘structural’ change.  
 
The sheer speed of this process and the consequent weakness of underlying institutional 
structures meant that donor-supported Dalit NGO networks with their widening connections 
and high public profile were always going to be more significant as a discursive effect (Knox 
et al. 2006) than as an organisational structure fostering a sustained locally rooted social 
movement (see Mosse 2011 for an exploration of the implications of this).  Here was a 
powerful representational machinery on Dalit human rights manifest in episodic events, and 
selectively foregrounding aspects of Dalit lives and struggles which could be subject to the 
available and effective instruments of Dalit human rights monitoring and legal support, 
public hearings and jury panels linked to national and international human rights bodies (the 
latter having the objective of bringing international pressure on the Indian state on the 
question of caste discrimination) —  all part of the internationally linked network function. 
 
This brings me to the second effect of the Dalitisation of development under an international 
civil society human rights frame, namely the selectivity of attention to Dalit experience it 
involved. There are again different aspects to this. For one thing, within this frame Dalits are 
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positioned as ‘specific victims of discrimination and violence’ (Steur 2012: 65-6). The 
horrific cases of violence, rape and murder have, not surprisingly, been most prominent in 
construing Dalit experience as the abuse of human rights. This brings a legal framing and 
recourse to special criminal legislation (the Scheduled Castes [Prevention of Atrocities] Act 
1989) with the inevitable consequence that everyday actions of anti-Dalit violence and 
humiliation are ‘recontextualized’ into crimes that individualize and arguably exceptionalize 
caste discrimination (Rao 2009). This leads Steur to ask whether the human rights focus 
might ‘detract from examination of structural socio-economic relations’ (2012: 66). This 
question applies equally to manifestations of untouchability beyond the most extreme 
atrocities, especially the routine indignities  including exclusion from  teashops, streets, burial 
grounds, temples or worship prioritised within Dalit human rights action. Might attention 
again be drawn to untouchability as a ritual relationship isolated from a wider set of 
relationships of exploitation, exclusion and restricted opportunity? 
 
Dalit NGO-backed claims to, and conflicts over, village resources have  indeed been 
construed as action against untouchability. Particular focus is placed on the commons such as 
water, fish, trees or grazing land through which caste hierarchy was (and is) symbolically and 
ritually enacted. NGOs have also organised action for the repossession of lands allocated by 
British district administrators to Dalits but alienated by ‘upper’ castes (the panchama land). 
Not only does such action recall histories of caste injury and involve acts of Dalit political 
assertions, signified for example by the planting statues of Dr Ambedkar, using slogans, 
drumming, cooking beef and other reversed symbols of Dalit humiliation (Mosse 2012: 222-
4), but it also frames action against caste abuse in a way that allows appeal to anti-
untouchability law.  
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This is strategically important action, but because of the way in which the discourse on caste 
has been historically constituted and internationally articulated, Dalit experience tends to be 
selectively construed in ways that import distinctions (caste/non-caste) which reproduced 
rather than break from the inherited conceptual divide between the religious-cultural and the 
political-economic, caste and class, caste and gender, and analogous distinctions.   The Dalit 
rights agenda tends to be conceptualised in ways that takes the village as the quintessential 
site of struggle; if not over ritual exclusion and the humiliations of untouchability, it is in the 
form of struggles over land, the commons or village-level power.  This can be problematic 
because it is not always possible to localise the Dalit rights agenda into collective caste 
struggles  since today caste is active in shaping opportunity in new and invisible ways 
through the connections and capital necessary for entry into higher education or employment 
in public or private sectors, or through `non-traditional’ forms of discrimination in hiring, 
renting, or in the weakness of Dalit caste networks (or the lack of capital) in securing 
education, skills or employment; crucial structural processes that are not easily made visible 
as Dalit rights abuse  Many of the concerns of Dalit villagers themselves—  access to credit, 
education, jobs in towns, migrant labour, especially among young women and men—  may 
not articulate well with the anti-untouchability or caste-culture framing of development.  In 
this vein Anandhi (2012) explains how the Dalit rights discourses of national/international 
networks into which local NGOs are linked can hinder their ability to respond  to complex 
forms of local gender-and-caste oppression, including persisting patriarchy and domestic 
violence. 
 
NGO workers are not unaware of these dilemmas. While framed in the language of Dalit 
human rights, their interventions are understood and acted upon locally in different and more 
meaningful terms. So, for example, grassroots women’s groups reinterpret networked Dalit 
21 
 
rights activism to address gender-specific local issues such as obtaining house-sites in 
women’s names (Anandhi 2012, 2013); or in another case, anti-untouchability criminal law is 
deliberately used to back land reoccupation, not to underline the caste basis of the claim, but 
because the legal procedure allows the infringement of Dalit rights to be individualised to 
particular non-Dalit occupiers of panchami land thereby avoiding broader conflict between 
Dalits and caste Hindus (Sundara Babu 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, it is the case that caste/class and other distinctions through which action is 
represented become increasingly rigid as the discourse of Dalit rights travels ‘outward’ to 
national campaigns, UN advocacy, or to debates on caste discrimination in other legal 
jurisdictions (e.g., the U.K.) wherein the specific injuries of inherited status, ritual  impurity, 
pollution and stigma are re-centred.11 The critical question is whether a ‘culturalisation’ of 
caste inherited from the earlier missionary ‘spiritualisation’ of caste-poverty threatens to 
diminish the capacity of development actors (state, NGO, Church) to address the reality of 
Dalit poverty by obstructing the understanding of complex and changing local realities 
requiring varied approaches. At the very least, work is needed by development’s varied 
brokers and translators (Lewis and Mosse 2006) to mediate the disjunctures between NGO 
discourse shaped by its own political logic (as was the missionaries’) and the realities of local 
problems and actions.   
 
The third effect of rights approaches more broadly, concerns the way these are changing the 
local articulation of demand. In this regard, Krishnan (2011: 1) observes among Dalit 
villagers ‘a tendency to move from cultural-political emancipatory approaches to those of 
right-based approaches’. Rather than engage in agonistic relationships with dominant castes 
in struggles over resources and respect, Dalits ‘characterise the grievances suffered as a 
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failure of the state in implementing statutory measures of welfare and compensation,’ 
conceived as the abrogation of their rights – right to work, right to education, right to health 
(etc.) —  even though at one level a history of caste domination lies behind such state failure.  
 
The discourse of rights and of discrimination in development comes with the deeper 
politicisation of Dalit identity in relation to demand from the state. The struggles for land or 
employment are for Dalit land and Dalit jobs or Dalit enterprises.  At the micro-level, as 
Krishnan notes (pers.comm.), when Dalits are excluded for example from a water source 
installed by the state in the main village (the ur), the conflict that arises is resolved by 
provision of another water facility in the Dalit ‘colony’ (the ceri). The absence of collective 
action to break down the residential segregations produced historically through mechanisms 
of power, labour control, and denial of property which divide Tamil villages into the 
dominant ur  and the Dalit ceri  is striking .12 At the macro level, Dalit organisations 
campaign for a proportionally-allocated budget for the Dalit population, known as the Special 
Component Plan under the slogan ‘where is our money?’13 that is, for a share of resources 
generated  by capitalist growth, but not necessarily against the structural inequalities 
produced by that model of growth (Steur 2012). Thus, while NGO networks have 
significantly increased the effectiveness of mobilisation of Dalits against discrimination and 
for rights to development through politicized identities, it may be asked whether these 
demands for welfare parity leave unchallenged the structural relations of power and political 
economy (Steur, forthcoming).  Does the tactical focus on Dalit rights involve a merely 
political reversal in face of political-economic transformations (here neoliberal ones) that 
impoverish or dispossess (to use terms from Steur’s [forthcoming] engagement with Partha 
Chatterjee and Eric Wolf); might structural power even push tactical struggles in the direction 
of ‘mere’ identity politics which reproduce the divisions of caste among those with shared 
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interests as exploited groups, perhaps through the agency of Dalit NGOs themselves (ibid)? 
This is not the place to further debate these issues. But what can be noted is the way in which 
caste continues as a means for the articulation of ‘old antimonies of materialism and 
idealism’  (Roseberry 1982 in Steur forthcoming). 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
As a contribution to contentious debate on ‘religion’ and ‘development’, my purpose in this 
chapter has been to trace connections and continuities in a long trajectory of the artefactual 
and institutionally-driven bifurcation of religion and economy, culture and development, 
caste and class, identity politics and political economy, idealism and materialism  and the 
related processes of disembedding and abstraction whether in Christian mission, development 
or Dalit human rights activism. We started with the fact that drawing a distinction between 
the religious and the political-economic, or between caste and class, misunderstands the 
condition of Dalits for whom caste is a political-economic-ritual relationship, and whose 
labour was (and is) organised and controlled through ritual relations. This reality of caste is 
independent of religious affiliation (Hindu, Muslim, Christian). This is significant because a 
long history of ‘development’ interventions on behalf of Dalits —  missionary, state and 
NGO, colonial and postcolonial — had a double effect: first ‘culturalising’ caste (Natrajan 
2012) to producing the modern Dalit as a religious identity subject to ritual humiliation and 
ideological challenge (for example through religious conversion) and institutionalised into a 
denial of state protections and privileges to Christian or Muslim Dalits; and second producing 
the modern category of ‘labour’ separate from caste, or ‘shorn of heathenish caste 
characteristics’ (Viswanath 2014a: 8). The categorical distinctions between the religious and 
the economic and caste and class, served the particular interests of outsiders and their 
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political and administrative exigencies (Viswanath 2014a: 3). Beginning with Christian 
missionaries, these categorisations shaped the field of development for the state and NGOs, 
and provide a mould for contemporary forms of activism and advocacy on Dalit human rights 
and development. 
 
While the disembedding of particularistic caste into the universals of religion or rights 
constantly reintroduces misleading categorical distinctions, it should not be ignored that this 
may also be important, even necessary, as well as constraining. The Protestant Christian 
rendering caste as ‘spiritual slavery’ vastly increased the attention to untouchability (as an 
extreme form of subordination) and widened the potential networks of support and solidarity 
in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. The human rights (rather than religious) framing of 
untouchability achieves even wider reach for Dalits today. It has enabled the  problem of 
caste to be explained in ways that can be communicated to an international audience (for 
example, as a form of racism, Indian apartheid, religious persecution) and inserted within 
global forums such as the WCAR or the World Social Forum. The idea of Dalit rights has 
facilitated the mobilisation of financial support for Dalit NGO work in the expectation that 
this framing empowers local claims for resources or justice (Steur 2012).  
 
But we also know that what works well for ‘upward’ channelling within a Dalit human rights 
chain, or outward transmission to national and global forums, does not best serve the need for 
horizontal connections between different identities (Dalit, tribal [adivasi], labour, migrant) in 
relation to some particular and urgent livelihood threats or impoverishing processes. As Luisa 
Steur (2012) puts it, the question is what sort of solidarity is possible or desirable: a 
compassion-based response to Dalit suffering, or a solidarity-based response to 
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dispossession? In practice these imply different kinds of networks, on the one hand, networks 
of professionalised NGOs and churches, on the other labour movements and unions.  
Several NGO donors have themselves now begun to disfavour building development 
strategies on caste identities or Dalit dignity separate from class; investing not in ‘caste-
communitarian’ development, but in wider coalitions of interest around exploitation, and 
livelihood threats, or land and employment rights in the context of India’s rapid capitalist 
growth; reconnecting the politics of recognition to the politics of redistribution (see Mosse 
2011). In this connection,  Steur (forthcoming) shows how building alliances to challenge a 
‘land grab’ from multinational corporate investments near Chennai produced new practices of 
Dalit identity reconnected to land and economy. This involved different horizontal and 
international connections, while facing off co-opting ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
discourses and the state criminalisation of local protest. 
 
Meanwhile, Indian Dalit activism itself turns from claims about injury, to claims for 
development, from universal human rights to specific economic rights in the form of national 
budgeting and the Special Component Plan which is itself a challenge to the in-built 
assumption that Dalits derive entitlements as compensation for religiously-defined 
disadvantage suffered historically (or even on-going discrimination within the social and 
economic system), but insists instead on Dalits’ common entitlement (as Hindus, Muslims, or 
Christians) to a share of the national wealth. Both the NGO ‘de-dalitisation’ of development 
in favour of solidarity, and the demands for state budget allocations involve different ways to 
secularise caste and to dismantle the inherited categories of religion and development through 
which responses to Dalit impoverishment continue to be structured. 
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5 Even a Hindu Dalit faces the fact that, in the public and legal terms which give her certain rights as a member 
of a Scheduled Caste, her identity is fixed as a matter of lineage and historical injustice rather than present 
aspiration, and so this does not ‘relieve her from the burden of bearing the injured identity in her inner domain’ 
(Krishnan 2011).  
6 This itself proved controversial, since some castes among Dalits were and some were not associated with the 
Christian churches, and in an increasingly caste-divided Dalit social field contests arise over who defines ‘Dalit 
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universalist language of Christianity allowed a collaboration with other universalist languages in development or 
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12 For an exceptional break with the social geography of the “caste street” see Mosse 2012: 244. 
13 The increase in state revenues, and a dramatic reduction in, and greater state surveillance of, foreign funding 
for NGOs is also in part responsible for this focused attention on state-backed Dalit development to ensure that 
Daltis are part of India’s ‘inclusive growth’ (Steur 2012). 
